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The purpose

of this paper is to discuss

avowed commitment 1

to

why I think the Reagan

helping only "actual victims" of racial discrimination

retards rather than advances the cause of civil rights.
"seniority"

I

make reference in my title to

and "the shadow ofStotts" because the current administration

upon Supreme Court decisions having to do with
opinion in

administration's

Memphis Firefighters

v.

is

seniority, particularly its

Stotts, 2 to justify a

relying

1984

wholesale attack upon race-

conscious remedies, not only in employment but in education and public contracting
as well.

But how can an

effort to help actual victims of discrimination

positive development?

be anything but a

Why should I be criticizing rather than praising what the

Reaganites are doing? The short answer is that this policy of helping only "actual
victims" of discrimination has another objective: namely, to bring to an end a variety
of class-based remedies such as goals
etc.,

and timetables, numerical measures, quotas,

that courts and administrative agencies have found necessary, in some cases, to

rectify the effects of past discrimination

and to ensure the absence of discrimination

in the future.

The Reagan administration's approach

to

helping only "actual victims" of

discrimination threatens to undermine years of meaningful civil rights enforcement

and to hobble future

efforts to

remedy the lingering effects of discrimination. This

position, despite the administration's
is

drumbeat of public statements to the contrary,

not endorsed by the United States Supreme Court or by any of the 12 circuit courts

of appeals, the level just below the
if vigorously

pursued, offer

racial discrimination.

administration, in

Supreme Court.

It is

a position that does not, even

much hope for realistic change in

And,

finally, it is

national patterns of

not a position that the Reagan

my estimation, intends to pursue with vigor.

suggests that the administration, for

all of its

Other evidence

avowed commitment to

civil rights, is

engaged in a cynical campaign of sloganeering designed to give the appearance of

movement where, in fact, there

is

none.

The Reagan administration's position on this issue
Fourteenth

is

essentially as follows.

Amendment was designed to establish colorblindness as

constitutional standard. Plessy

v.

Ferguson

3
,

The

the

Supreme Court decision that

the 1896

established the "separate but equal" doctrine, violated the colorblind principle (some
call it the antidiscrimination principle)

by using racial

Jim Crow laws affecting

public accommodations and by providing the basis for

education, voting, and every other area of public

classifications with respect to

life for

the next 58 years.

Brown

v.

Board of Education ,4 the 1954 ruling declaring the separate but equal doctrine
unconstitutional in the field of public education, rectified the error of Plessy and

returned us

to the original

understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. Race could

no longer be an appropriate consideration in the allocation of public benefits or
burdens. Since Brown, however, the Reagan administration says that society,
propelled by federal courts and administrative agencies, has
direction of race-consciousness, committing the
albeit in this case in favor

They tend

to cite as

of,

error as at the time of Plessy,

not against, blacks and other racial minorities.

examples of this trend: busing to achieve desegregation of

previously dual school systems because
race; goals

same

swung back in the

and timetables

or quotas to

it

requires the assignment of children by

remedy proven

racial discrimination in

employment and housing; and voluntary race-conscious plans to remedy significant
underrepresentation of minorities in employment, public contracting, and higher
education admissions. Such practices, according

only violate the Constitution but do violence

to the

to the

Reagan administration, not

purposes of the modern

civil rights

statutes (like the 1964 Civil Rights Act) as well.

Their solution

is

as follows to the best of my understanding: (1)

enforced in a colorblind fashion.

(2)

Laws should be

Those who discriminate should be enjoined from

5

doing so in the future.

(3)

Persons who were the specific targets of such

discrimination are entitled to individualized relief ("actual victims").

persons are entitled

to

anything.

But let us look

at

what the

(4)

No other

courts have said about the colorblind Constitution.

The Supreme Court has never held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause prohibits the use of race classifications under all circumstances.

Rather,

it

has required (putting Plessy and the separate but equal doctrine line of

cases to one side) that racial classifications be justified by the showing of a compelling

governmental purpose. Race

under

classifications are disfavored

this analysis. Post-5 rown,

innumerable

and inherently suspect

classification

schemes that

disadvantaged blacks or other racial minorities were struck down on this basis. The
only Supreme Court case that employed this rigorous test and yet upheld a scheme
that penalized a racial minority, before or after Brown, was the Korematsu decision.

This decision found constitutional the relocation of Japanese-Americans during the

Second World War.
In more recent years, the Court has upheld racial classifications as
constitutionally based upon
effectively

its

conclusion that such approaches were necessary to

remedy discrimination against blacks and other

racial minorities. In the

area of school desegregation, for example, the Supreme Court concluded that the

mandate

of Brown could not be satisfied by a school board's merely

pupil assignments would no longer be

made on

announcing that

a racially segregated basis, leaving

deeply-rooted patterns of the dual systems in place. Rather, school boards, said the

Court, had an affirmative duty to see that the old patterns were ended "root and

branch." 6 If busing was necessary to achieve this end, so be
ratios

were later approved as a starting point

in

it.

System-wide racial

determining the level of

desegregation required on a school-by-school basis in such systems. 7

The Bakke decision,8 although

struck

it

down

the Davis Medical School special

admissions program, did not reject the use of race in admissions.

Bakke have continued to take

race into consideration in

These programs have withstood lower federal and
Fullilove decision the

Many schools after

making admissions decisions.

state court scrutiny.9 In the

Supreme Court upheld a federal 10%

1980

set-aside for minority

business enterprises as part of a $4 billion public works program. 10

Lower federal courts and state
recognizing, even

if the

courts have adhered to these precedents, often

Supreme Court did not publicize

Fullilove (affirmative action decisions)

it,

that in Bakke and

some justices were no longer using the

"compelling interest test" but were using something less rigorous to evaluate the
racial classifications at issue. In neither the

Supreme Court nor other federal

or state

courts has the proposition that only "actual victims" of discrimination are entitled to
benefit from remedial orders been adopted.

Judicial interpretations of the civil rights statutes have also recognized an

appropriate place for racial considerations. In the 1979 Weber decision,! 1 the

Supreme Court upheld the use
and management.

It

of race in a crafts- training

program agreed

to

by labor

said that the plan did not violate Title VTI of the 1964 Civil

Rights Act, which prohibits employment discrimination. The Reagan administration
contends that Weber was wrongly decided. The Court has also held that busing to
achieve desegregation of previously dual systems did not violate another provision of
the 1964 Act. 12

It

even upheld the use of race

to

remedy evidence of discrimination

in

voting as not prohibited by the 1965 Voting Rights Act. 13 In none of these cases has
the scope of relief turned on whether one was an "actual victim" of discrimination.

What has been

left

undecided? The Supreme Court has yet

several major questions pertinent to this discussion,
before

it for

decision this term. 1 4

employment, designed

to

Can

all of which

to rule explicitly

on

are raised by cases

courts order race-conscious programs in

remedy proven discrimination, that benefit persons other

than those specifically found

to

have been denied a job, promotion, or assignment

based upon race? In other words, are goals, timetables, and quotas appropriate? 15

Can

courts approve of settlements or proposed consent decrees that contain provisions

designed to avoid the litigation of employment discrimination claims? 16 Can

governmental entities establish, consistent with the requirements of the
Constitution, voluntary race-conscious affirmative action programs like that

approved (insofar as private employment was concerned) in the Weber decision? 1 ?

The Reagan administration contends that all these questions were
answered by the Supreme Court's recent decision
case called Stotts.

(6-3) in the

effectively

Memphis Firefighters

A careful reading of the decision, however, does not support such

an interpretation. In

brief, Stotts ruled that

lower federal courts could not require

that seniority rules be overridden in order to prevent disproportionate layoffs of
recently hired black firefighters.

I

will

have more

to

say about the Court's

characterization of the issue presented for decision in a later section. Given that
characterization, the Court's decision

was quite

predictable. First,

it

had previously

held, on several occasions, that Title

VH of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits

racial discrimination on both public

and private employment, insulates seniority

systems from court restructuring, even
discrimination, unless

it

if they

perpetuate other forms of employment

can be shown that the system at issue

itself was created,

maintained, or manipulated with a discriminatory purpose or intent. 18 Second,
also

had held previously that where discrimination was evident in

it

hiring, promotion,

assignment, or other terms and conditions of employment, the appropriate remedy

was

to give actual victims of such practices, all other things

they would have had but

for the discrimination. 19

This

is

being equal, the seniority

commonly called the

"rightful place" doctrine.

The

Stotts record

was devoid

of evidence of either type of discrimination.

Properly read, the holding in Stotts

is

merely a reiteration of rulings the Court has

made on several occasions in the past.

It

reinforces the view that seniority systems

enjoy powerful protection from attack under Title VII. Overriding seniority to allow
for race-conscious layoffs, Stotts says, violates the very essence of that protection. It
is in this

context of seniority-and only here-that the Court has found a statutory

requirement that only "actual victims" be given individualized
It is true,

relief.

however, that the opinion speaks generally (outside the seniority

context) about the Title VTTs purpose being to provide only "actual victims" of

But the discussion

is

subject to a variety of

interpretations, of which the administration's

is

only one.

discrimination with

relief.

moreover, that the same opinion notes-and appears

It is

to find

equally true,

no statutory problem

with-the consent decree that underlies the entire controversy in
several years earlier, filed suit against the

Stotts.

Memphis Fire Department alleging racial

discrimination in hiring and promotion. That suit was settled prior to

settlement was embodied in a consent decree in the 1980

Under that decree,

the

Blacks had,

trial,

trial.

Memphis fire department agreed to establish

black interim hiring goal and a

20% black promotion goal

black representation in each job classification in the

fire

and the

a

50%

until the proportion of

department was

approximately that of blacks in the labor force in the county within which Memphis
is

located. Parenthetically, the fire

department had entered into a similar

arrangement with the U.S. Department of Justice

employment discrimination

suit.

The

in

1974 in settlement of a. federal

Stotts opinion described the

1980 decree in the

following terms:
[I]t is reasonable to believe that the "remedy," which was the
purpose of the decree to provide, would not exceed the bounds of
the remedies that are appropriate under Title VTI.

What the Court found wrong in Stotts was not the underlying consent decree
containing goals and timetables. Rather

it

was the attempt by the

trial court

and

court of appeals to engraft upon that decree a provision that had not been agreed to by

the parties that violated Titled VII. That provision, added by the courts, required
that in the event of layoffs affirmative action considerations might be permitted to
override the application of "last hired, first fired" seniority principles. It
see, therefore,

how Stotts can be viewed as prohibiting all

to assist "nonvictims," as the

is difficult to

use of goals and timetables

Reagan administration contends, not only where

seniority issues are involved but also in hiring

and promotion situations where

seniority is not a controlling factor.

The

Stotts decision explicitly declines to address the question of whether

can legally be applied
administration

to the case of public employers. Yet,

official stated

with some confidence, after

Weber

one Reagan

Stotts, that it

would not be

long before the Court concluded that voluntary affirmative action programs were
unconstitutional. 2 *)

Nor does Stotts address the question

of whether courts can,

consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, provide relief to other than "actual

victims" in remedying racial discrimination.
I

cannot avoid noting here

my objection to the way the Supreme Court and

indeed the Justice Department characterized the issue in
distinct impression that

power

Memphis, not the

The

Firefighters

One is left with the

what happened there was that federal courts exercised raw

to favor less senior blacks over

name of affirmative

Stotts.

action.

more senior whites in the layoff process in the

Two things are wrong with that characterization.

courts, decided that a race-conscious layoff plan

Union

itself had offered

a

First,

was necessary.

number of racially neutral approaches

that would have achieved significant economies (reducing working hours of all

employees, for example).
Second, the three white firefighters

who were laid off for only

a

month were

characterized as the victims of the layoff plan. Yet they had exactly the
seniority dates as three blacks

same

who were not laid off. The "seniority system," which

the lower courts ignored, was, in

fact,

an alphabetical layoff scheme. In the event

8

that workers had the same seniority and equal work records, layoffs would occur in
reverse alphabetical order. Hence, under the city's original plan, Johnson, Jones, and

McFagon,
were

to

(blacks)

were

be retained.

qualified

to

be laid off and Darden, Dennington, and Harmon, (whites)

What happened, therefore, was that blacks-who were equally

and of equal seniority to whites-hired pursuant to the consent decree would

be laid off and their white counterparts kept on because of the fortuitous

first letter of

their surnames.

Based upon

Stotts, the

Reagan Justice Department last year sent letters to over

50 communities advising them that their affirmative action programs were illegal

and threatening to sue them

to

have such programs discontinued

if they

did not do so

voluntarily. 21 It should be noted that in all these cases the affirmative action

programs being attacked were

initiated with the approval of the Nixon, Ford,

Carter Justice Departments. Most communities have refused

to

and

change their

programs. The mayor of Indianapolis, a Republican, has been most vocal in his
opposition to

what the department is doing.22 And lower federal courts have

continued to order goals and timetables as remedies
post- Stotts, 23 except

for

employment discrimination

where doing so would override seniority provisions,24 viewing

those situations as explicitly controlled by that decision.

But why should remedies for discrimination that benefit other than

so-called

"actual victims" of discrimination be allowed as a matter of public policy, apart from

what the current or future
if

we kept the use of racial

legal standards
criteria to

taken this approach in the past?

and

state judges, both elected

may require? Wouldn't we all be better off

an absolute minimum?

Why have the courts

Why have federal judges of all political persuasions

and appointed,

all

over the country acted as they have?

Let me offer a few answers.
I

have already spoken about school desegregation and the imposition of an

affirmative duty upon school boards to do more than declare the end to segregated

assignment patterns.
is

I

take

it

that this administration's view of school desegregation

that only black children affirmatively assigned to schools by race or denied

admission

to a public school

based upon their race are "actual victims" of

discrimination. For their benefit, courts

Supreme Court,

They have viewed

differently.
class, for

at least since 1968,

which a

class

remedy

may order specific remedies. But the

and other courts thereafter have seen things

the constitutional violation as one against blacks as a
is

appropriate.

A recent decision by a federal district court in Nashville, Tennessee, approving
a consent decree designed to resolve a 17-year-old higher education desegregation
case points up this conflict between traditional approaches and the

Reagan

administration's policies. Without going into excruciating detail about this case (a

temptation

I

find hard to resist since

I

long trial of this case in 1976), suffice

was co-counsel
it to

for plaintiffs

during a month-

say that federal courts found in 1972 that

the State of Tennessee had been operating a dual higher education system 18 years
after

Bro w n. Courts

also found in 1977 that the state

had engaged in

specific

segregative acts in the Nashville area to provide white college students with a

way of

avoiding attendance at Tennessee State University (the traditionally black public
institution in that community). Specific relief was ordered for Nashville but not for

the state as a whole.

The most recent skirmishes have focused on

state-wide relief. After

discussion the state and private plaintiffs reached a settlement, which

by the

district court over the partial objection of the Justice

much

was approved

Department.

Among

other things, the Reagan administration opposes a provision of the settlement that
requires the state, over a period of five years, to establish a special "pre-enrollment"

program

for

75 black sophomore students

to train

and prepare them

for

post-graduate

study in the state's professional schools. Upon completion of the program, these
students will be admitted

to the state's schools of law,

10

veterinary medicine, dentistry,

pharmacy, and medicine. The administration's opposition

to this

program stems

from the fact that the 75 students are not "actual victims" of discrimination.

The

trial court's

opinion contains the following response to that argument:

the past and present state of Tennessee's universities that
the Court identifies as the specific instance of racial
discrimination; its effects are pervasive throughout the black
community, affecting practically all black men, women and
children in the state. 25

It is

The Washington Post reported
having said

to the

a blunter response from the judge. It quoted

him as

department's lawyer in the case:

You are an embarrassment to the United States Justice
Department or maybe it's that someone is telling you what to
say.... Let's just shell the corn. ..your real problem is that
President Ronald Reagan and Attorney General William
French Smith are philosophically opposed to anything that
smacks of goals or objectives or quotas. Isn't that right? 26

That this criticism came from a judge who, I can personally
heart or knee-jerk liberal but rather conservative, in
this administration's policies

fact,

attest, is

no bleeding

may suggest to you how far

have departed from conventional doctrine. The Justice

Department has appealed the approval of the pre-enrollment program and other
provisions that

it

regards as unconstitutional.

Moreover, goals and timetables or other injunctive relief affording benefits to
nonvictims have been granted by courts

to

ensure that a defendant found guilty of

discrimination does not continue such practices in the future, particularly
discrimination was longstanding, pervasive, and intentional.

rushed

to

2?

if that

Courts have not

impose such requirements but have done so often only after lesser measures

effected no changes. Courts have tended to avoid imposing goals

quotas in race discrimination where

to

and timetables or

do so would displace an identifiable group of

incumbent white employees. Hence hiring rather than promotion

employment process where such techniques

11

is

the stage of the

are utilized most often. 2 8

Furthermore, consent decrees and settlements have been approved that contain
goals and timetables because such voluntary solutions are consistent with the

underlying purposes of Title VH, namely,

to stimulate corrective

protracted litigation. Voluntary programs

variety of statutory provisions
niceties, not

make

fit

into the

measures short of

same basic pattern.

actual victimization dependent

upon procedural

whether discrimination actually occurred. Under Title VH,

victims of discrimination prior to 1964 have

or no recourse.

little

Finally, a

Even

for

example,

so-called

"actual victims" post-1964 can lose out by not filing their administrative complaints

within 180 days of the violation. 29

But suppose the "actual victim" approach was used in nonseniority situations?
If no victims or

only a few of the "actual victims" can be found, then the person guilty

of racial discrimination gets a windfall.

An employer can be found liable for

discrimination against blacks as a class but may be allowed to continue with an

all-

white, or virtually all-white, work force until another victim comes to light. That

operation stands as a potent symbol that one can discriminate and get
It is

away with it.

a continuing sign to blacks that they will not be welcome in that operation and

need not apply. Such an approach creates

all

the

wrong incentives and disincentives

in terms of the objectives of Title VII. Similar examples could be given in the

housing, public contracting, education, and voting areas. What, for example,

is

the

proper remedy for a black that graduated from Tennessee State University 15 years

ago?

He or she is unlikely-even though an actual victim because of discrimination in

admissions-to graduate or to do professional study in Tennessee, to want to take

advantage of the pre-enrollment program embodied in the recent consent decree. But
that

is

what the Reagan administration seems to

If we

out whites

require.

found "actual victims" of discrimination, we might also be obliged

to

who were

that,

the windfall beneficiaries of discrimination and see to

where necessary, remedies

for "actual victims" be

12

it

granted at the expense of

seek

incumbent whites. But the courts have not and

will not be willing, it

take this approach in even seniority cases where
positions

it

and situations that would not have been

seems

to

me,

to

can be shown that whites occupied

their's

but for discrimination

against blacks. Hence "rightful place" seniority relief has not been interpreted by

lower courts, as the Court pointed out in
whites.

Stotts, to require

The Court's reaction has been understandable,

"bumping" of incumbent

for often

white workers have

not knowingly discriminated against blacks. The culprit in the piece

is

the employer.

More exacting demands ought to be made upon the employers, not workers,

to

remedy

the discriminatory effects.

But I think that there is evidence that the Reagan administration has no
intention of pursuing with vigor this "actual victim" approach.

Under the best view

of their motivations they simply misunderstand the problems presented

by any

serious attempt to implement their vision. For example, an official at the Federal

Equal Employment Opportunities Commission was questioned about its new
emphasis upon requiring "unconditional

would have had

if no

offers" to place victims of bias in the job

discrimination had occurred, even

if the

they

job has been filled by

another person. "Won't such an approach create another set of victims in the work
place-those

who were given jobs through

discriminatory actions over which they had

no control?" he was asked. "Not really," he responded, "we're talking about a job that
should have gone

to that victim,

not a job based on goals and timetables. "30

How this approach can be viewed as less problematic and less socially divisive
than properly utilized goals and timetables in the

spirit of Title

VTI

is

hard

for

me to

comprehend. Moreover, this type of individualized enforcement has not been pursued

even by the Justice Department,

to

m> knowledge, and only

half-heartedly by the

EEOC or the Department of Labor for the simple reason that their resources could not
begin to support such an undertaking.

I

see nothing to suggest that massive

resources to do the job will be forthcoming under this administration.

13

Viewed less charitably, however,

this

emphasis upon "actual victims" is

nothing but a publicity stunt. The administration has taken or promised certain
actions that belie their
First, it

avowed commitment to

has already attempted, unsuccessfully,

black plaintiffs must carry in order

Under the prevailing doctrine a
to

this course. Let

show only that he

me mention only four.

to increase significantly the

to establish

a case of employment discrimination.

plaintiff in a so-called disparate

or she is black,

burden

treatment case has

was qualified for the job, applied for a job or

promotion, was denied the job, and the job remained open thereafter. Yet, the

Reagan Justice Department attempts to
could be established only

if the

get the

Supreme Court to hold that a case

black plaintiff could show that he or she was as or

more qualified than the person actually hired. 31 The
have this heavier burden

to carry,

logic is simple. If plaintiffs

they have less chance of prevailing, less chance of

qualifying as an "actual victim," and less chance of being entitled to full recovery.

Second, a top Justice Department

official

has recently suggested that

all

current requirements that employers maintain personnel records on race, sex, or
national origin should be abolished. With no such statistics, there can be no serious

search for "actual victims" and no serious assessment of compliance with
antidiscrimination laws. 32
Third, the administration has attempted, ever since the beginning of the first

Reagan term,

to cut

back drastically on regulations promulgated pursuant to

Executive Order 11246, the contract compliance order requiring government
contractors to take affirmative steps to avoid discrimination against racial
minorities.

The matter is currently the

subject of intense debate

between Labor

Secretary Brock and Attorney General Meese, with the latter seeking a total end to
the use of goals or timetables. 33 Of course,
is for

more modest revisions of the

I

find

order. But,

it

heartening that Secretary Brock

however that debate

likely that this administration, ultimately, will water

14

down

is

resolved,

it is

a potent tool utilized by

every president from Franklin Roosevelt to Jimmy Carter to open up jobs for
minorities and

Fourth,

women.

we have seen

this play before.

Early in Reagan's

first

term, the head of

Reagan's Civil Rights Division in the Justice Department announced that he was
going to dispense with traditional desegregation litigation techniques. Instead, he

was going to go

school by school to ensure that blacks were not denied equal

educational resources. 34

community.

It

I

have yet to see that policy implemented in a single

was not meant to be.

may turn out to be a severe blow to civil rights

So, helping only "actual victims"

by bringing class-based

and replacing it with what, under the best of

relief to a halt

circumstances, will be a puny, ineffective attack upon pervasive examples of
lingering racial discrimination.

What sounds like a noble effort consistent with

the

best traditions of America-helping "actual victims" of discrimination-is at best a

naive and senseless undertaking and at worst a cynical political game.
I

really

have a feeling that the courts will continue
is.

to see this

program for what it

My fear, however, is that public energy and the prior commitment to

addressing our legacy of racism will be diverted and disheartened by these untiring
efforts of the

Reagan administration

to

turn the clock back.
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